Επιστολή (Αρ.34) του Φορέστη (Κέρκυρα 31 Ιουλίου 1806) προς τον The Right Honorable Charles James Fox His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for the Foreign Department με την οποία τον ενημερώνει για την προέλαση των Γάλλων στην Δαλματία, με κίνδυνο να φτάσουν και να καταλάβουν ακόμα και την Ελλάδα. Από την άλλη το Κάτταρο για τους Ρώσους αποτελεί το μόνο λιμάνι που μπορούν να διαθέτουν στην Αδριατική, χωρίς το οποίο είναι αδύνατον να ανταπεξέλθουν κατά την περίοδο του χειμώνα. Κατά συνέπεια το Κάτταρο θέλουν οι Ρώσοι να παραμείνει υπό τον έλεγχό τους, κάτι που ζητούν και οι ίδιοι οι κάτοικοί του, οι οποίοι δεν επιιθυμούν να βρεθούν ούτε υπό γαλλική ούτε υπό αυστριακή κατοχή. Επίσης, αναφέρεται και στην καχυποψία των Ρώσων για την παρουσία του τουρκικού στόλου στο Ιόνιο. Τέλος, ο Φορέστης κάνει λόγο και στην προσπάθειά του να διατηρήσει τις φιλικές του σχέσεις και την επικοινωνία του με τους πασάσες της Αλβανίας, οι οποίοι αναγνωρίζουν την ισχύ της Βρετανίας.
Συγκεκριμένα ο Φορέστης γράφει στην επιστολή του:
Sir,
I have the honor to inform you that last night dispatches were received here by the Russian agents from St. Petersburg under date 25th May. They were forwarded from the Bocche di Cattaro, and accompanied by a packet of dispatches for the Court of Naples, which will be forwarded this day on board a ship of war. I learn, from the authority of the Russian minister and of rear admiral Greig, that at the closing of the above dispatches at St. Petersburg the Imperial Cabinet was divided in its sentiments respecting the evacuation of the Bocche di Cattaro; yet positive orders had been sent, a month before, to the Russian Commander in Chief to evacuate that place. The state of affair however in Dalmatia having much changed by the occupation of Ragusa and its territory by the French, and the Bocchese inhabitants having resolved not to give themselves up either to the French or Austrians, the Commander in Chief judged it right to suspend the execution of the above positive orders, in which decision he is justified be every principle of sound policy and humanity.
It appears now that this place will be retained by our Allies. The decision of this interesting question will be known on the return of the Bocchese Deputies, as mentioned in my last number. The credit of the Russian Arms, their political influence and good faith, is at issue on this occasion. In a military point of view the possession of the Bocche di Cattaro is essential to the interests of Russia in these parts. For, without, a port in the Adriatic, it is impracticable to keep that sea in the winter season. The enemy, however, finding that they cannot gain possession of that place as they had thought now no longer regard it as essential to their purposes. The Russian agents here inform me that the enemy are actually advancing at the back of Cattaro through the Turkish territory in a southern direction. Should this be the case, Cattaro indeed becomes of little importance. For beyond it there is no barrier; but entering immediately into the plains, the progress is easy; the Russian agents apprehend that should a new coalition be in preparation. The common enemy will, in the mean time, gain possession of Greece. The accounts from Dalmatia are alarming. The forces of the enemy are said to be very considerable and commanded by General Massena.
The Russians want much, and seem to expect, a reinforcement of ships and also supplies of stores and provisions of which they are in great need.
A Turkish squadron is expected in these waters, a circumstance that gives much uneasiness to our allies here. They totally distrust the views and movements of the Turks. …
I still keep up a friendly correspondence with the neighbouring Pachas in Albania with whom, for so many years and particularly during the last war, I have been so much connected and who, I am happy to say, are fully convinced of the good faith, honor, and power of Great Britain.
I have the honor…