Επιστολή του William Meyer (Kew, Surry, 23 Νοέμβρη 1807) προς τον G. Hammond στο Υπουργείο των Εξωτερικών, με την οποία τον ενημερώνει για την κατάσταση στην οποία βρίσκονται η Κέρκυρα και τα υπόλοιπα Επτάνησα μετά από αίτημα του τελευταίου (George Hammond (1763–1853) was a British diplomat and the first British envoy to the United States from 1791 to 1795), ενώ παρουσιάζει όλα τα στοιχεία που κατά την γνώμη του καταδεικνύουν την σημασία και την αξία των νησιών για την Μεγάλη Βρετανία από εμπορική, στρατιωτική και πολιτική άποψη. Επίσης ο Meyer παρουσιάζει και στοιχεία που αφορούν στις οικονομικές δραστηριότητες των Επτανησίων, όπως για παράδειγμα κάνει αναφορά στην αλιεία, στην παραγωγή λαδιού, κρασιού και σιτηρών ενώ αναφέρεται και στις ανάγκες για νερό και την τροφοδοσία της Κέρκυρας από την επαρχία της. Αυτή η παρουσίαση γίνεται με αφορμή την πρότασή του περί αποκλεισμού των νησιών και ιδίως της Κέρκυρας από τα βρετανικά πλοία, λόγω της κατοχής του νησιού από τους Γάλλους. Ενώ τονίζει πως σαφώς οι κάτοικοι προτιμούν την βρετανική έναντι της γαλλικής προστασίας. Από την άλλη κάνει και μία αναλυτική παρουσίαση των θέσεων και σκέψεων του Αλή Πασά επ΄αφορμής της κατάκτησης των νησιών από τους Γάλλους, ανώ αναφέρεται και στις σκέψεις των τελευταίων ακόμα και για την δολοφονία του, τονίζοντας πως δεν θα πρέπει ο Αλή Πασάς, που υλοποιεί τα σχέδιά του παρά τις πιέσεις από τον Ναπολέοντα ή και από τον Ορλώφ, για παράδειγμα, να θεωρηθεί φίλος της Μεγάλης Βρετανίας. Και αυτό γιατί η περίπτωση κατάληψης της Κέρκυρας από τους Άγγλους θα δυσαρεστήσει σφόδρα τον Αλή, ο οποίος στην ουσία αντιμετωπίζει την Κέρκυρα ως την περιοχή που θα τον δεχτεί και διαφυλάξει σε περίπτωση ανάγκης. Ιδιαίτερη έμφαση, βέβαια, δίνεται στην σημασία της Κέρκυρας ως της περιοχής που διαφεντεύει το εμπόριο της Αδριατικής αλλά και ως της περιοχής που κανείς πρέπει να κατέχει αν θέλει να έχει τον έλεγχο του εμπορίου στον Λεβάντε, κάτι που για τον Meyer είχε αντιληφθεί η Γαλλία και για αυτό επεδίωξε την κατάληψη της Κέρκυρας και των Επτανήσων, εν γένει. Για αυτούς τους λόγους και ο Meyer προτείνει, όσο ακόμα είναι ατελής και ανολοκλήρωτη η κατάληψη της Κέρκυρας από τους Γάλλους, την επέμβαση των Βρετανών. Όμως δεν μένει μόνο εκεί, αλλά συνεχίζει την ανάλυση των θέσεών του, συγκρίνοντας την Μάλτα με την Κερκυρα και τονίζει με έμφαση, πως μόνο η κατάληψη της Κέρκυρας από τους Βρετανούς θα επιτρέψει τον περιορισμό της δύναμης και της παρουσίας των Γάλλων στην Ανατολή, ενώ παράλληλα με την κατάληψη της Κέρκυρας θα μπορούν να βελτιωθούν και οι σχέσεις της Βρετανίας με την Αυστρία, ενισχύοντας αποφασιστικά το εμπόριο στην περιοχή (το αναφέρει στο τμήμα της ανακεφαλαίωσης της έκθεσής του). Ο Meyer κάνει, όμως, και αναφορά στην σημασία του εμπορίου στα νησιά και μάλιστα το παρουσιάζει ως την κύρια επιχειρηματική δράση των Επτανησίων και ιδίως των Κεφαλονιτών, τους οποίους και αποκαλεί ως αμφίβια όντα. Όμως παρά την σημασία και των άλλων νησιών, η Κέρκυρα παραμένει το πιο σημαντικό νησί, και για την ασφάλεια και την κατοχή της τα άλλα νησιά στην ουσία έρχονται σε δεύερη μοίρα, κάτι που καθιστά και την κατάληψή τους ζήτημα εύκολο, μια και τα όποια φρούρια ή στρατιωτικά σώματα υπάρχουν επί της ουσίας για τις ανάγκες αντιμετώπισης πειρατικών επιδρομών ή περιπτώσεων τοπικών εξεγέρσεων και στάσεων. Τέλος, ο Meyer επισυνάπτει και δύο πίνακες (σ.249 και 250) με περιγραφή των μεγεθών των Επτανήσων, του πληθυσμού τους, των προϊόντων που παράγουν, τις οικονομικές δραστηριότητες των κατοίκων κτλ.

Ακολουθούν οι πληροφορίες που αποστέλλει ο Meyer στον Hammond:

Kew, 23 November 1807

Some Political and Military Details of the Island of Corfu
The neighboring Islands etc etc.
The intrinsic value of the island of Corfu consists in its
a) rich and extensive agricultural resources,
b) its excellent harbor capable of containing the largest navy, secure from all peril or attack; a harbor that cannot be destroyed by human efforts,
c) its complete and extensive fortifications, easily susceptible of being made impregnable,
d) its capacious and commodious naval arsenal.
The extrinsic value of the island consists in the
a) absolute command it possesses over the connection between the Adriatic and the rest of the Mediterranean by means of its geographical position and extensive maritime resources.
Hence the foreign commerce of the Adriatic states is dependent on the will of the possession of Corfu.
Hence their domestic traffic is dependent on the same power as far as it can be an active traffic
b) in its vicinity to the most accessible and populous districts of the Albanian coasts and in the reciprocity of wants of the inhabitants of the Terra Ferma and the islanders; whereby a permanent influence over the strongest western Turkish provinces is acquired or facilitated,
c) in the command it assumes over the other Ionian Islands,
d) in its commercial relations,
e) in its resources as a colony
f) in the decisive, sometimes incalculable advantages it affords as a military or naval station to foreign states.
If the above enumerated properties and attributes of the island of Corfu were not incontrovertible, its importance for the purposes of states may be sufficiently evinced by the ceaseless efforts made by the ancient governments of Greece, Rome and the Eastern Empire to obtain possessions of it. And by similar efforts made in modern times by the Neapolitan, Turkish, Genoese, Venetian and Russian governments to become possessors of it; by the exertions made to fortify and hold it when in their respective possessions; and by the severe sacrifices which have usually attended the surrender of it. These proofs are farther confirmed by the extraordinary efforts lastly made by the French to occupy this island. The governments that have possessed it have generally acquired the ascendancy both of commerce and naval power and of political influence in the Adriatic and Levant seas.
The extensive, regular and solid fortifications (* note: the fortifications of Corfu may be divided into three parts: those on the terra Ferma into the outer and inner works; those from the sea comprising the batteries on the small island of Vido) chiefly raised and completed by the Venetians, in the first decennium of the last century with a view to defy forever the attacks of the Turks, have ever since that time, been essentially growing to decay, with the exception of partial reparations. The use and abuse of them alternately made by the French, Turks and Russians between the years 1797 and 1802 have rendered a great part of them useless as fortified works. The outworks are in a much more dilapidated state than the formidable ramparts and bastions immediately investing the town.
In 1797, on the occupation of Corfu by the Republican French armies, 600 pieces of cannon (400 of which of brass) all of Venetian foundries, were found regularly mounted, with platforms etc.
In March 1799 on the expulsion of the French from Corfu by the joint but languid efforts of the Turks and Russians, chiefly roused and supported by British energy, the greater part of this ordnance was found. Most of the brass guns were carried off by the Russians to the Black Sea. They were ordered to be restored. They were replaced by old iron cannons.
Since 1802 not more than 100 pieces of heavy ordnance, half of them of brass, have been mounted and planted in the bastions and ramparts investing the town; about half of them on ill framed unserviceable carriages; the remainder are nearly planted but not mounted. In 1806 one hundred new gun carriages were received from the Black Sea. They are of bad materials chiefly of firewood; and more adapted to naval than garrison artillery. All the outworks are totally disgarnished of their guns.
Essentially connected with the fortifications of Corfu, particularly as it regards an attack on the town from the sea is the small now naked island called Vido. It lies N. about one mile distant from the town, extending in length about two miles, in breadth half mile. It commands entirely that part of the harbor that washes the town. It has seven batteries situate on the beach, three commanding the port; three towards the North Channel and one towards the Turkish coast. The batteries on the NW and SW extremities of the island command within gunshot the entrance of ships to the harbor, keeping the coast of Corfu on board. These batteries contain in all 32 guns. When occupied, by the French they were manned by 350 men. The batteries commanding the port and town being a Fleur d’ Eau may be silenced and carried without difficulty by frigates or 74s from the superior elevation and extent of the naval batteries and from the strong impression they can make by approaching close in with them, by favor of the deep water. This island was reduced by the Turks and Russians in 1799. The siege of Corfu was unnecessarily protracted and enhanced by the ill combined and ill supported attacks of the United squadrons upon this strong hold, which if once reduced and occupied by the besiegers, affords the principal means of annoying the enemy within the town, which under such circumstances could not long resist. Gun boats, bombards might by favor of the night be useful send from the island so reduced, to batter the ramparts, bombard the town etc etc. The safe anchorage without gunshot of Vido and in all parts of the Channel of Corfu for ships of all description, affords great advantages for an attack from the sea.
Corfu if attacked by combined sea and land forces, could not in its present state make a long successful resistance. The island of Vido in its present state might at any time be carried by surprise during the night, by means of three or four ships of war, which stationed off the N.W. end of Corfu might that the advantage of favorable winds and weather, and run down the Channel to Vido, not six leagues distant, debark and carry the batteries, spiking the guns if necessary. Such a result would be morally certain, if the service proposed were entrusted to commanders who already know the position of the batteries and the nature of the island and navigation. In that case the ships might be at once laid alongside and the batteries a fleur d’ eau. The attack is made at once at various and opposite points would distract divide the energy’s forces. If a debarkation were effected, the batteries could be of little use and they might at the first broadside be silenced. If attacked by commanders acquainted with the station, the enemy, if alarmed, would find their device of frustrating the besieger’s fire by exposing false light and nugatory.
The outworks on the land side commanding the town are, as before observed, in a state of dilapidation and in many parts of ruin. The greatest utility desirable from them in their present state would be to employ the choked souterains and as Mines, by decoying the assailants in their direction.
A regular defense of those extensive decayed works would be impracticable without a greater sacrifice of men than the besieged could afford. And the expenditure of powder by exploding mines would be greater than the stores on hand might admit of. If the outworks or part of them were occupied by the assailants, and the place be blockaded by sea, the surrender of it must soon ensue, through losses, famine fatigue etc, while the besiegers would possess unmolested, nay aided, all the recourses of the country.
The forces of the enemy on the 2nd of October did not exceed 1000 men; one third of the force necessary to the successful defense of the fortress.
It is not probable that the French will introduce Turkish troops or even Albanian Greeks, should they procure them, into the island, owing to the inveterate hatred of the Corfiots towards these barbarians, whose brutal excesses they have of line experienced.
As to the means of improving and providing for defense, so late as August last there was neither timber iron, nor prepared materials of masonry on the island. Should regular supplies not have been received there since the enemy will probably derive the necessary iron work by melting down the large quantity of old iron cannon. Timbers for gun carriages and palisades may be obtained from the unserviceable ships etc. The wood for all purposes, always imported from the opposite Albanian coast, more indispensable during the ensuing winter months, may be supplied by the living forests of olive trees on the island, and extremity already anticipated by the unfortunate planters.
The want of gun powder and lead was so urgent in the months of February and March last, that the Russian agents were obliged to apply to the British stores at Malta and Messina for those supplies. This scarcity so injurious to the Alliance, and to the Russian operations was occasioned by the improvident fraudulent expenditure of ammunition among the Montenegrines during the months between February and December 1806, the result of collusion between the commanders and commissaries.
The French having stripped the churches and other buildings of their lead during their former occupation of Corfu, and which have remained since uncovered, cannot now look to the same resource.
As to the means of subsistence, if blockaded by sea, the fisheries, the principal resource of the inhabitants, would be totally end off. The same cause would prevent their supplies of bullocks etc which to a head, are imported by contract from Albania and only in small numbers at a time, owing to the want of pasture and proper means for maintaining them. Wine is produced but for five months’ consumption; corn for four months. Without the sake of the oil, money will be wanting for purchasing the necessary supplementary subsistence, even if the markets were open. Forced loans must be resorted to; and from the present tendency of things in Corfu, summary martial law will be established. The town is chiefly supplied with fresh water from the country. It is dependent on the large cisterns within its walls if cut off from the country. The rains in the winter months are frequent and heavy. But the water collected in the cisterns would barely furnish enough for subsistence, exclusive of other necessary purposes.
If great supplies of Corfu have not been imported from the Morea or Naples during the last three months, the stock of provisions on land, supposing a blockade by sea, cannot exceed three months consumption from this date.
The long and rigid religious abstinences of the Greeks, with the great quantities of oil and olives deposited in the town, might greatly conduce to support the inhabitants. But the approaching winter season must tend to enhance the privations and sacrifices of the people. Under these circumstances no emigration should be permitted by the blockading ships.
It is however to be presumed that the French have already taken the precaution of ordering all the landholders to reside in their estates under certain conditions.
From such a situation of things it is evidently the interest of the islanders to prefer British to French protection. Their resistance against British forces would be at all times weak and involuntary conscious that no advantage could accrue to them from it. The inhabitants are sunk into a state of perfect apathy, despondency and disgust; distrusting in everything; the result of their repeated misfortunes, disappointments and ineffectual efforts. They are passively resigned to their destines.
Succors and cooperation would be gladly but secretly offered and afforded by Aly Pacha if properly managed. He sees with keen, though dissembled vexation, the French in Corfu. He sees that so long as they shall hold Ragusa, Cattaro and Corfu he must be a vassal to France; and his whole coast in a state of siege. His death is an occurrence that has not escaped the calculations of Bonaparte. It will be compassed, if he think that Great Britain should intrigue with him, or he if betray his disappointment and displeasure at his new neighbors.
The penetration, the forecast of this barbarian chief, bordering almost on divination, may perhaps yet enable him to be to dupe his pretended friends. He has hitherto made an easy tool of all parties, however subtle their schemes, or imposing their pretensions. Not Orloff in Greece, not Bonaparte in Italy, not his own government, nor foreign states have gained upon his interests to the advancement of their own. A Turkish Albanian invested with despotic power, still reigns, is still detested and is till caressed.
This chieftain would doubtless be the real judicious friend of Great Britain, if she were to occupy Corfu. He would be secure at least of an invisible asylum when assailed or ruined; a consolidation for his avarice, his ambition and his pride. Nor can he doubt that that powerful government, that has so decisively and so instantaneously brought to naught the subtle formidable machinations of its enemy in the North against its legitimate rights; now leave unassailed that station that serves at the present as the centre of his arsenal, of his military operations, of his commerce and of his political influence in the South of Europe! The French would not willingly extend their conquests eastwards, should Corfu be possessed by Great Britain. It is a formidable military station for near his own vital yet unsettled empire to be left, so circumstanced, in the rear of his conquests. The Adriatic is the emporium of Levant commerce. Corfu commands the Adriatic. The colonization of Egypt, the possession of Constantinople would afford but little profit to the enemy, if Corfu remained an hostile station. Are not these among the reasons that induced France to occupy that important post?
At present, France possesses all these vast resources for increasing and consolidating her power and her prosperity. To resist effectually such increase, to diminish her actual power, these sources must be wrested from her yet imperfect grasp, and among the first the fortress, arsenal, harbor, colony and communication of Corfu.
Should France foresee such a change, she would hasten to bring forward Russia to aid or sanction her subversion of the Turkish Empire. For blockaded in the Dardanelles, with Corfu in the hands of Great Britain, then the score arbiter of her future commerce, in the Levant and Adriatic Seas, Turkey could not long cooperate, but would secretly obstruct a power that only oppressed or ruined her. The French could no longer flatter the Porte with plans of compensation and rule, so long as Corfu remains a possession of the British Empire.
Could Malta produce the effects desired it would be superfluous to dwell on Corfu. But to restrain the otherwise interminable extension and resistless impulse of French power in the East, to diminish her actual power, are effects, that, admitting the life of Bonaparte, are only to be realize by the occupation of Corfu by British Forces.
In the train of operations, necessary to attain, with the least sacrifices, this great object, the aid desirable from the Ionian Islands and places on the opposite Turkish coasts, might be advantageously resorted to.
The port of Vathi in Ithaca can admit and accommodate a squadron of ships of war.
The more commodious and extensive harbor of Cephalonia might be at all times a rendezvous; a place of refreshment. The approach to these ports is open. No fortified works deserving of consideration exist to oppose the entrance of ships of war. The inhabitants whose only livelihood is traffic, overawed by no foreign or domestic armed force, would cordially lend their good offices to that nation, whose command over their natural element they respect and fear; more especially the Cephaloniotes, whose adventurous naval genius and piratical dispositions are well known. Many valuable seamen might here be easily obtained. For deprived of their former and only mode of subsistence, there amphibious beings must either enter into a foreign service, or fill the too populous ranks of the Enemy.
The Ionian Islands have always served as auxiliary stations to the assailants or possessors of Corfu, in proportion to their means of availing themselves of such aids. They have consequently, sooner or later followed the fate of that island, the only one in the Ionian Sea, that possesses resources for a state. For these reasons it is evident Bonaparte will sacrifice all other views and interests connected with the other islands, to maintain Corfu; provided that his forces be not equal to the attainment of these secondary purposes, which at present they cannot be.
Neither the geographical position, extent, population, or produce have rendered the other islands deserving of any regular defensive works, beyond what is necessary to secure their principal towns etc against the attacks of pirates, domestic rebellion etc.
Cephalonia, Zante, Ithaca, and much more the small islands of Paxo and Cerigo might be rendered subserviced to the purposes of the besieger of Corfu, more especially if they possess the decided superiority at sea.
The island of Santa Maura or Leucadia, alone has received some strong defensive works, lately, augmented and fortified by the Russians in order to repel the attacks and incursions of Aly Pacha’s troops. These works have been lately garrisoned by the French troops and for the same reasons. The murderous ferocious armed bands of Aly Pacha, whose only object and incitement to warfare is plunder and rapine, can be more easily set on by his commands than restrained by them. Against such invaders, the Santa Mauriotes would gladly unite their best forces with any present succors of what nation so ever. The island is indeed almost abandoned by a population rarely exceeding 15,000 souls, who have taken refuge in the other islands. The fortified works are exclusively directed against the Turkish coasts are of not utility in other directions.
The ex-Venetian places on the Turkish main Butrinto, 10 miles N.E. of Corfu, Parga 50 miles and Prevesa 70 miles, might be made subsidiary to any military operations against Corfu. They are all defended by ports. They are important chiefly as communications with the interior of Albania, and are the maritime keys of it.

Recapitulation

The possession of Corfu in necessary to prevent the farther extension of French power in the East; to diminish and counteract her actual power.
It is as presented attainable without great sacrifices.
If reduced, a garrison not exceeding two regiments, with a company of artillery, would fully suffice to ensure external and internal security and order; protected at the same time by naval forces.
Hence it is a possession appropriate to Great Britain, being a place of great strength and incalculable, and requiring so small a number of men.
The occupation of Egypt and Constantinople by the enemy, would be but negatively injurious to Great Britain, if Corfu were possessed by her, because the enemy could not then derive the positive advantages resulting from such occupation.
The possession of Corfu by Great Britain would favorably influence the conduct of Austria to her.
It would open new and great avenues to neutral commerce as lately restricted by the British government.
The greater the number of commercial stations now occupied by Great Britain, the more beneficial to her general interests will be the operation and result of those regulations.
If the possession of Corfu be important to the temporary interests of the British Empire, it is equally so to its permanent interests. Its possession carries with it at all times the most important political and commercial relations.
Considered as a future cession it will produce much more than it can cost.
Considered as a colony and as an establishment it will amply repay the expenses of occupation.
It is obvious however that the numerous Greek islanders destitute of subsistence by the total suspensions of commerce, their main support, will soon enter into the pay of enemy increasing his means of defense, if long left to their fate.
That the profit and utility of this conquest depend therefore on the vigor and celerity with which it is attempted.
It would be an operation of a certain decision result, preventing the full consummations of an evil, already too fatal in its effects to the imprescriptible rights and liberties of mankind.